Bounds on Quantile Treatment Effects of Job Corps on Participants' Wages by Blanco, German et al.
Bounds on Quantile Treatment Eects of Job Corps
on Participants' Wages
German Blanco
Food and Resource Economics Department, University of Florida
gblancol@u.edu
Carlos A. Flores
Department of Economics, University of Miami
caores@miami.edu
Alfonso Flores-Lagunes
Food and Resource Economics Department and Economics Department,
University of Florida, and IZA, Bonn, Germany.
alfonso@u.edu
Preliminary and Incomplete Draft
Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Associations
2011 AAEA & NAREA Joint Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, July 24-26, 2011
Copyright 2011 by Blanco, Flores and Flores-Lagunes. All rights reserved.
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial




This paper assesses the eect of the U.S. Job Corps (JC), the nation's largest
and most comprehensive job training program targeting disadvantaged youths, on
wages. We employ partial identication techniques and construct informative non-
parametric bounds for the causal eect of interest under weaker assumptions than
those conventionally used for point identication of treatment eects in the pres-
ence of sample selection. In addition, we propose and estimate bounds on quantile
treatment eects of the program on participants' wages. In general, we nd con-
vincing evidence of positive impacts of JC on participants' wages. Importantly, we
nd that estimated impacts on lower quantiles of the distribution are higher, with
the highest impact being in the 5th percentile where a positive eect on wages is
bounded between 8.4 and 16.1 percent. These bounds suggest that JC results in
wage compression within eligible participants.
1 Introduction
Assessment of the eect of federally funded labor market programs on participants'
outcomes (e.g., earnings, education, employment, etc.) is of great importance to policy
makers. To answer the question about these programs' eectiveness vis-a-vis their public
cost, one relies on the ability to estimate causal eects of program participation, which
usually is a dicult task.1 The vast majority of both substantive and methodological
econometric literature of program evaluation (see Angrist and Krueger, 1999, Blundell
and Dias, 2009, and Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) focuses on estimating causal eects
of participation on total earnings, which is, as pointed out by Lee (2009), a basic step for
a cost-benet analysis. Evaluating the impact on total earnings, however, leaves open a
relevant question about whether or not these programs have a positive eect on the human
capital of participants, which is the ultimate the goal of active labor market programs.
Total earnings are the product of the individual's wage times hours worked, in other
1When conducting evaluation of these kind of programs one has to deal with a missing data problem,
i.e., an individual may either be participating in the program or not, but no one individual can be in
both states simultaneously. In the econometric literature this inherent fact of both experimental and
observational studies is referred to as \the fundamental problem of causal inference" (Holland, 1986).
2words, earnings have two components: price of labor and quantity supplied of labor.
Therefore, by focusing on estimating the impact of program participation on earnings,
one can not distinguish how much of the eect is due to human capital improvements.
Clearly, assessment of the eect of program participation on human capital requires to
focus on the price component of earnings, i.e., wages. The importance of the eect of
labor market programs on participants' wages stems from its direct relationship with the
improvement of the participants' human capital due to the program, which is essential
for individuals to boost their labor market opportunities. In addition, the estimation of
this eect allows policy makers to better understand the components through which these
programs lead to more favorable labor market outcomes.
Unfortunately, estimation of the causal eect of program participation on individu-
als' wages is not straightforward due to the sample selection problem (Heckman, 1979).
Basically, we only observe wages for those individuals who are employed, and thus, com-
parable individuals' wages may or may not be observed. Even in experimental settings,
randomization does not guarantee the comparability of individuals' wages in treatment
and control groups, since a person's decision to be employed is endogenous and occurs
after training has been completed.
In this paper, we use the data from the National Job Corps Study, a randomized
evaluation of the Job Corps (JC) program which is funded by the U.S. Department of
Labor, to empirically assess the eect of training on participants' wages. To accomplish
this objective we construct informative nonparametric bounds for the causal eect of
participation. This strategy requires weaker assumptions than those conventionally used
for point identication of the average treatment eect in the presence of sample selection.2
Similarly to Lee (2009), our analysis starts by computing the Horowitz and Man-
ski (2000) \worst-case" scenario bounds. Their general approach imputes missing data
with either the largest or the smallest possible values, using these extremes to compute
2Point identication of average treatment eects typically requires strong distributional assumptions
such as bivariate normality (Heckman, 1979). One may relax this distributional assumption by relying
on exclusion restrictions (Heckman, 1990; Heckman and Smith, 1995), which are variables that determine
selection into the sample (i.e., employment) but do not aect the outcome (i.e., wages). It is well known,
however, that in the case of employment and wages both types of assumptions are hard to satisfy in
practice (Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Angrist and Krueger, 2001).
3the largest or the smallest possible treatment eect, which constitute bounds that are
consistent with the observed data. As such these bounds do not require the use of exclu-
sion restrictions nor making distributional assumptions. While the approach encompasses
non-refutable assumptions in settings where the outcome data is missing, it requires the
availability of a bounded support of the outcome. As a result, the \worst-case" scenario
bounds' width is uninformative in our particular application.
Subsequently, we proceed by imposing more structure through the use of several as-
sumptions and derive results using the Principal Stratication (PS) framework (Frangakis
and Rubin, 2002).3 In addition to assuming random assignment of a binary treatment,
which is satised in our application, the construction of our bounds requires assuming
weak monotonicity of mean potential outcomes at three levels: individual, within subpop-
ulation and across subpopulations.4 These subpopulations (strata under PS framework)
are dened by the values of two variables: the potential treatment status and an employ-
ment indicator that determines the observability of the outcome (i.e., wages). Given the
binary nature of both variables, this set up gives rise to four principal strata.
These assumptions are not totally new to the growing body of literature on partial
identication. For example, in a setting similar to ours, Zhang et al., (2008) and Lee
(2009) derive bounds for the eect of a job training program on wages, assuming random
assignment of treatment and individual level monotonicity.5 While the former uses PS
to derive results, both studies in essence devised the same identication strategy of a
trimming proportion of the outcome distribution that allows tightening the bounds for
average treatment eects. Relative to the Horowitz and Manski (2000) \worst-case"
bounds, resulting bounds in Zhang et al., (2008) and Lee (2009) are tighter and do not
rely on the availability of a bounded support of the outcome.
3The PS framework has its roots in the analysis of identication of local average treatment eects
using instrumental variables in Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)
4Even though, bounds on the parameter of interest involve only one subpopulation, i.e., always em-
ployed individuals independent of treatment assignment, the assumption of weak monotonicity across
subpopulations requires interaction with other subpopulations found in a sample.
5The assumption of individual level monotonicity has also been used in dierent settings. For example,
Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2010) use PS to derive bounds on the population net and mechanism average
treatment eect in a setting where outcome data was always observed. Zhang and Rubin (2003) use PS
to estimate causal eects when some outcomes are truncated by death.
4An example of the identifying power of assuming monotonicity within subpopulation
can be found in Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2010, FF hereafter). They use in spirit the
same identication strategy as Zhang et al., (2008) and Lee (2009), and assume weak
monotonicity of mean potential outcomes within subpopulations to construct bounds
on the net and mechanism average treatment eects. Finally, the assumption of weak
monotonicity across subpopulations is also considered in Blundell et al., (2007), Zhang
et al., (2008), and more recently in Lechner and Melly (2010) and FF (2010). This
last level of monotonicity, which is also known in the literature as stochastic dominance
(Manski and Pepper, 2000), imposes further restrictions resulting in tighter bounds. In
particular, the identication strategies in Blundell, et al., (2007), who derive sharp bounds
on the distribution of wages and the interquantile range to study income inequality in the
U.K., and Lechner and Melly (2010), who use partial identication to bound wage eects
of a German job training program, are similar since they both require non-parametric
estimation of the conditional distributions of the outcome. In contrast, the identication
strategy that we follow is similar to Zhang et al., (2008), Lee (2009), and FF (2010), which
does not rely on a non-parametric estimate of a conditional distribution of the outcome.
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we provide a substantive em-
pirical analysis of the eect of the Job Corps training program on participants' wages.
The analysis is considered substantive for two reasons; the rst is due to the current im-
portance of Job Corps. With a yearly cost of about $1.5 billion, Job Corps is America's
largest job training program, as such, this federally funded program is under constant
scrutiny, and given that its eectiveness has always been debatable, with legislation seek-
ing to cut federal spending, the program's operational budget is currently under threat.
The second reason is that our results provide evidence to answer a policy relevant ques-
tion about the impact of Job Corps on more disadvantage participants, and hence its
eectiveness. Importantly, data to derive our results come from the rst nationally rep-
resentative experimental evaluation of an active labor market program for disadvantaged
youth (Schochet et al., 2008), and thus implications can be generalized, with condence,
to Job Corps at a national level.
The second contribution is methodological in nature. Using the PS framework and
relying on a set of weak monotonicity assumptions to tighten nonparametric bounds, we
5provide the basis for analyzing treatment eects in dierent quantiles of the distribution of
an outcome in the presence of sample-selection. In doing so we propose the construction of
bounds on the \Local Quantile Treatment Eect" (LQTE). Intuitively, after identifying
the upper and lower bounding distributions of individuals that are always employed inde-
pendent of their treatment assignment (our stratum of interest), bounds on the LQTE are
constructed by looking at the dierence between quantiles of these trimmed (marginal)
distributions and the distribution of control individuals who are employed. Our strategy
of identication of bounds is similar to Zhang et. al., (2008), Lee(2009), and FF (2010).
Our approach is distinguished from these three in that we go a step further into analyzing
quantiles.6
In summary, by exploiting the ability of the proposed quantile model we characterize
the heterogeneous impact of Job Corps training on dierent points of the participants'
wage distribution. Compared to Lee (2009), who uses the same dataset as we do and
assumes individual level monotonicity only, our bounds are tighter and more informa-
tive about the sign of the eect of training on wages, suggesting a positive eect on
wages bounded between 3.4 and 9.3 percent. We go a step further in our analysis and
report bounds for treatment eects on the 5th;10th;:::; and 95th percentile of participants'
post-treatment wages. Our results suggest that the impact on lower quantiles of the dis-
tribution is higher, with the highest impact being in the 5th percentile where a positive
eect on wages is bounded between 8.4 and 16.1 percent. In other words, after accounting
for the systematic heterogeneity in the impact of Job Corps on participants' wages we
conclude that in addition to having a positive impact on wages, across the entire distri-
bution, the program has an eect of wage compression within disadvantage groups. To
our knowledge, the latter eect has not been previously identied, and thus it sheds light
on the eectiveness of Job Corps at a new, important level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey describes the Job
Corps, the data and its source the National Job Corps Study. Section 3 formally denes
sample selection and briey introduces a general identication strategy of bounding treat-
6Conventionally, other models of quantile treatment eect rely on instrumental variables (Abadie, An-
grist and Imbens (2002) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005)), while the partial identication strategy
we propose does not.
6ment eects. In section 4 we introduce the Principal Stratication framework and the
assumptions necessary to construct bounds on the treatment eect. Section 5 proposes
bounds on quantiles treatment eect needed to analyze the heterogeneity of eects of
Job Corps training on participants' wages. Section 6 contains our empirical application
results. We conclude in section 7.
2 Job Corps and the National Job Corps Study
This subsection briey describes both the Job Corps program and the randomized
experiment, known as the National Job Corps Study (NJCS), which generated the data
used in this empirical analysis.
Job Corps is America's largest and most comprehensive residential education and
job training program. This federally funded program was established in 1964 as part of
the War on Poverty under the Economic Opportunity Act, and is currently administered
by the US Department of Labor (DOL). With a yearly cost of about $1.5 billion, Job
Corps annual enrollment ascends to 100,000 students (DOL, 2010). The program's goal
is to help disadvantaged young people, ages ranging from 16 to 24, improve the quality
of their lives by enhancing their labor and educational skills set. Eligible participants
are provided with the opportunity to benet from the program's goal through academic,
vocational, and social skills training provided at over 123 centers nationwide (DOL, 2010).
Participants are selected based on several criteria, including age (16-24 years), legal US
residency, economically disadvantage status, living in a disruptive environment, in need
of additional education or training, and be judged to have the capability and aspirations
to participate in Job Corps (Schochet et al., 2008).
Being the nation's largest job training program, the Job Corps' history is full of con-
troversy and its eectiveness has always been debatable. During the mid 1990's, the US
Department of Labor commissioned Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (MPR) to design
and implement a randomized evaluation, the NJCS, in order to determine the program's
eectiveness. The main feature of the study was its random assignment, namely, individ-
uals were sampled from nearly all outreach and admissions agencies (OA)7 located in 48
7Outreach and admissions (OA) agencies conduct recruitment and screening for Job Corps. OA
7continuous states and the District of Columbia and randomly assigned to treatment and
control groups. During the sample intake period, between November 1994 and February
1996, a total of 80,883 rst time eligible applicants were included in the study. From this
total, approximately 12% were assigned to the treatment group (Nt = 9,409) while 7%
of the eligible applicants were assigned to the control group (Nc = 5,977). The remain-
ing 65,497 were assigned to a program non-research group (Schochet et al., 2001). After
recording the data in a baseline interview, for both treatment and control experimental
groups, a series of follow up interviews were conducted at weeks 52, 104, 156, and 208
after randomization.
Randomization took place at the OA level, that is, before participants' assignment to
a JC center. As a result, only 73% of the individuals randomly assigned to the treatment
group actually enrolled in JC. Even though individuals assigned to the control group
were embargoed from participating in JC for a period of 3 years after random assign-
ment, 1.4% of them enrolled in the program within the prohibited period (Schochet et
al., 2008). Therefore, in the presence of this non-compliance, the dierence-in-means es-
timator, which compares average outcomes between individuals by random assignment to
a treatment or a control group, represents the \Intention-to-Treat" (ITT) eect (Flores-
Lagunes et al., 2009). Similarly to Lee (2009) and Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2010), the
present empirical analysis focuses on estimating informative non-parametric bounds for
the ITT parameter. However, we go a step further and use bounds to analyze JC's eect
on dierent quantiles of the distribution of wages.
In particular, this paper uses the same dataset employed by Lee (2009), who devel-
ops an intuitive trimming procedure for bounding average treatment eects of Job Corps
program on participants' wages.8 Similarly to Lee (2009), the present analysis abstracts
from missing values due to interview non-response and attrition over time by only in-
cluding individuals who had no missing values for the post-treatment variables: weekly
earnings and weekly hours worked. Thus, the resulting sample size, NLee=9145, is smaller
than the original NJCS sample size, N=15386. Due to both programmatic and research
reasons, dierent subgroups in the population study had dierent probabilities of being
agencies include private nonprot rms, private for-prot rms, state employment agencies, and the
centers themselves (Schochet et al., 2001).
8For a description of Lee's (2009) trimming procedure refer to footnote 18 in section 4.1.
8included in the research sample, and thus, subsequent analysis requires the use of design
weights (Schochet, 2001).9
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Pretreatment variables in the dataset
include: demographic variables (rows 1 to 12), education and background variables (rows
13 to 16), income variables (rows 17 to 25) and employment information (rows 26 to 31).
As expected, given the randomization, the distribution of these pretreatment character-
istics is similar across treatment and control groups, i.e., the dierence in the next to last
column is not statistically signicant at a 5% level of condence. The resulting dierence
for post-treatment earnings across groups, also reported in penultimate column, is quan-
titatively equivalent and consistent with the previously reported 12% positive eect of JC
on participants' earnings (Burghardt et al., 1999; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2009; Schochet
et al., 2001). Results were also consistent with those obtained in previous studies when
looking at the eect of JC on participants' weekly hours worked (Schochet et al., 2001).
3 The Sample Selection Problem and Identication
of Treatment Eects
Assessing the impact of job training programs on participants' wages, as pointed out
by Zhang et al., (2008) and Lee (2009), is distinct than assessing the program's impact
on earnings. Notice that earnings are the product of the individual's wage times hours
worked, therefore, the latter impact encompasses the eect on the likelihood of being
employed (labor supply eect) and the eect on wages. The impact on participants'
wages, however, can be interpreted as pure price eect, which is the focus in the present
study since signicant increases in wages can be directly related with the improvement
of the participants' human capital due to the program, which is essential for individuals
to boost their labor market opportunities. In particular, one of JC main goals is the
enhancement of participants' human capital through academic and vocational training,
and thus, a proper assessment requires focusing on the program's impact on wages.
9For example, OA agencies had struggle recruiting females for residential slots. Therefore, sampling
rates to the control group were intentionally set lower in some areas, to overcome diculties with unlled
slots. See Schochet (2001) for more details on reasons and calculation of design weights.
9It is well known, however, that estimation of program's treatment eect on partici-
pants' wages is complicated due to the fact that we only observe the wages of those who
are employed, which is often referred in the literature as the sample selection problem
(Heckman, 1979). Formally, let's assume an experimental setting with N individuals and
with only two observable causes denoted by i, where i=1 indicates that individual i
has been randomly assigned to participate in the program (treatment group) and i=0
denotes no participation (control group). Yi, individual i's wage, is assumed to be a linear
function10 of the treatment indicator i and a set of pretreatment characteristics x1i,
Yi = 1i + 2x1i + 1i (1)
The self-selection process into employment is assumed to be linearly related to the
treatment indicator i and a set of pretreatment characteristics x2i,
S

i = 1i + 2x2i + 2i; (2)
where S
i is a latent variable representing the propensity to be employed. Let Si de-
note the observed employment indicator that takes values Si=1 if individual i is employed




where 1[] is an indicator function. Therefore, Yi is only observed when individuals
self-select into working, i.e., Si =1 when individual i's propensity to work is positive
(S
i  0).
Conventionally, point identication of the parameter of interest 1, which is as-
sumed to be constant for the entire population, requires strong assumptions such as joint
independence of the errors (u1i, u2i) in the wage and employment equations (1) and (2),
10Linearity is assumed to simplify the exposition of the sample selection problem and the identication
of treatment eects. However, the alternative non-parametric approach to address sample selection, which
is the focus of this paper, does not impose linearity to identify bounds on treatment eect parameters.
In fact, as shown below and in subsequent sections, the identication procedure discussed in this study
makes no functional form assumptions.
10respectively, and the regressors i , x1i and x2i , and bivariate normality of the errors (u1i,
u2i). One may relax the bivariate normality assumption about the errors by relying on
exclusion restrictions (Heckman, 1990; Heckman and Smith, 1995), which are variables
that determine employment but do not aect wages, or equivalently, variables in x2i that
do not belong in x1i; but it is well known that in general nding such variables that go
along with economic reasoning is in practice dicult (Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Angrist
and Krueger, 2001).
An alternative approach to model sample selection suggests that treatment eect
parameters can be bounded without making strong distributional assumptions or without
relying on the validity of exclusion restrictions. Following a conservative general frame-
work provided by Horowitz and Manski (2000)11 (HM hereafter), bounds on treatment
eects when data is missing due to a nonrandom process, such as the self-selection into
not working (S
i < 0), can be constructed, provided that the outcome variable has a
bounded support. These bounds are known in the literature as \worst-case" scenario
bounds (HM).
For ease of explanation we now switch to a slightly dierent notation than the one
introduced above, let's dene the average treatment eect (ATE) using the potential
outcomes framework (Rubin, 1974), as the following
ATE = E[Yi(1)   Yi(0)jXi] = E[Yi(1)jXi]   E[Yi(0)jXi]; (3)
where Yi(0) and Yi(1) are the two potential wages for unit i under control (i=0) and
treatment (i=1), respectively. For simplicity we are going to suppress the conditioning
on Xi, where Xi=(x1i, x2i). Conditional on i and the observed employment indicator Si,
the ATE in (3) can be written as:12
11In their paper Horowitz and Manski (2000) derived conservative bounds on population parameters of
interest using nonparametric analysis applied to experimental settings with problems of missing binary
outcomes and covariates. Their general framework, however, can be applied to continuous outcome
variables, thus allowing to model sample selection in our setting (Lee, 2009).
12Notice that outcomes of individuals are compared by random assignment. In the presence of non-
compliance, conditioning on the assigned treatment indicator i the formulae for ATE is interpreted as
the \intention to treat" (ITT).
11ATE = E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1ji = 1)+
E[Yi(1)ji = 1;Si = 0]Pr(Si = 0ji = 1)
 E[Yiji = 0;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1ji = 0) 
E[Yi(0)ji = 0;Si = 0]Pr(Si = 0ji = 0)
(4)
Examination of Equation (4) reveals that from the data we can identify all the
conditional probabilities (Pr(Siji)), and also the expectations of wage when conditioning
on Si=1 (E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1] and E[Yiji = 0;Si = 1]). Unfortunately, due to sample
selection, from the experimental data is not possible to point identify E[Yiji = 1;Si = 0]
and E[Yiji = 0;Si = 0]. We can, however, impute \worst-case" scenario bounds on
these unobserved quantities, provided that the support of the outcome lies in the interval
(Y LB;Y UB), i.e., the missing outcomes E[Yiji = 1;Si = 0] and E[Yiji = 0;Si = 0] can
take any value in the interval (Y LB;Y UB). The HM lower and upper bounds (LBHM and
UBHM respectively) are calculated from the data as follow:
LB
HM = E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1ji = 1) + Y
LBPr(Si = 0ji = 1)
 E[Yiji = 0;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1ji = 0)   Y
UBPr(Si = 0ji = 0)
UB
HM = E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1ji = 1) + Y
UBPr(Si = 0ji = 1)
 E[Yiji = 0;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1ji = 0)   Y
LBPr(Si = 0ji = 0)
(5)
In the next sections we follow, in spirit, this general bounding approach and proceed
by imposing more structure through the use of several assumptions in the context of the
Principal Stratication framework (Frangakis and Rubin, 2002).
4 Principal Stratication Framework and Identica-
tion of Bounds on Treatment Eects
Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2010) (FF hereafter) employed the Principal Stratica-
tion (PS) framework (Frangakis and Rubin, 2002) to study the mechanisms or channels
through which the treatment works. To accomplish their objective, FF decomposed the
12ATE into net average treatment eect (NATE), dened as \the average potential out-
come from a counterfactual treatment in which the eect of the original treatment on
the mechanism variable is blocked minus the average potential outcome under control"
and mechanism average treatment eect (MATE), which is equal to ATE-NATE. In
their paper they used local net average treatment eects (LNATE) and local mechanism
average treatment eects (LMATE), which are dened at the principal strata level, to de-
rive informative non-parametric bounds for the population NATE and MATE. As they
pointed out, their approach for identication of LNATE can be useful to study treat-
ment eects when dealing with sample selection. In our particular application, treatment
eects on wages are identied after controlling for the self-selection \mechanism", i.e.,
employment, which can be done for a specic \local" subpopulation comprised of individ-
uals with dened wages, thus the focus here is on the local net average treatment eect
for those who are always employed independent of treatment assignment.
FF approach followed in essence the same identication strategy employed by Zhang
et al. (2008), who also used PS framework, and Lee (2009). FF's study, however, was
not limited by a context where selection causes censoring of the outcome of interest, and
therefore, they were able to derive non-parametric bounds for the population parameters,
NATE and MATE, which enables learning \how" the treatment aects the outcome.
In our case, similarly to Zhang et al. (2008) and Lee (2009), the focus is on the average
treatment eect on wages, which are censored when the individuals are not employed.
Thus, the identication of the ATE on wages requires controlling for selection into em-
ployment (the mechanism), and it will become clear in this section that this is equivalent
to focus on the LNATE for a subpopulation for which the mechanism is not aected
by the treatment. Mainly, this section is devoted to summarize FF's main identication
results as well as to apply them to our particular application, which is the identication of
informative non-parametric bounds for the treatment eect of JC on participants' wages.
PS framework introduced by Frangakis and Rubin (2002) allows for identication of
average causal eects when controlling for a post-treatment variable that has been aected
by treatment assignment. In the context of JC, this aected post-treatment variable is
employment. Following FF terminology, this variable is referred to as a mechanism. It will
become clearer in the next few paragraphs that whenever individuals belong to the same
13principal strata, which are constructed based on the potential values that the mechanism
can take, which is a function of the treatment, comparisons between average outcomes
by treatment assignment will have a causal interpretation since the strata an individual
belongs to is not aected by treatment assignment.
Consistent with the notation introduced in the previous section, based on Equation
(2), it is clear that the mechanism Si, is aected by the treatment (i). Hence, the
mechanism, denoted as Si(), has two potential values Si(0) and Si(1), when i is assigned
to control and treatment, respectively. Given Si() potential values, FF dened the
\composite" potential outcomes as Yi(i;Si()).13 The potential outcome Yi(1;Si(0))14
is used to dene NATE, since it represents the potential outcome of individual i under
treatment in which the eect that i=1 has on the mechanism is controlled, such that
Si()=0. The ATE in (3), without the conditioning on X, can be decomposed using
Yi(1;Si(0)) as follows:
If we write the ATE = E[Yi(1)   Yi(1;Si(0))] + E[Yi(1;Si(0))   Yi(0)]; then the
NATE can be formally dened as:
NATE = E[Yi(1;Si(0))   Yi(0)]; (6)
and the MATE = E[Yi(1)   Yi(1;Si(0))]. As mentioned at the beginning of this
section, in our particular application (treatment eect of program participation on wages)
discussion of the MATE is out of the scope of the paper,15 the focus instead is on LNATE,
which will be formally discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
Basic principal stratication consists in partitioning individuals into groups based
on the values that the mechanism vector fSi(0);Si(1)g may take. Let Si() be binary.
This is the case in the context of our application since Si() may only take a value of 0 if
individual i is unemployed and 1 if employed. As a result, the four principal strata are:
13Notice that the potential outcomes Yi(1;Si(1)) and Yi(0;Si(0)) correspond to the conventional po-
tential outcomes Yi(1) and Yi(0) used in Equation (3). Two more potential outcomes are generated from
the \composite" process, Yi(1;Si(0)) and Yi(0;Si(1)), for more detail see FF (2010).
14The potential outcome Yi(1;Si(0)) represents the counterfactual used in the denition of NATE
given at the beginning of this section.
15Perhaps one may be interested in studying \how" the treatment works, in other words, understanding
the mechanisms or channels through which the treatment aects participants' wages (Blanco, et al., 2011).
14NN = Si(0) = 0;Si(1) = 0
EE = Si(0) = 1;Si(1) = 1
EN = Si(0) = 1;Si(1) = 0
NE = Si(0) = 0;Si(1) = 1
(7)
In the context of JC, NN is the strata for those individuals who would be unem-
ployed independent of treatment assignment, EE is the strata for those who would be
employed independent of treatment assignment, EN represent those who would be em-
ployed if assigned to control, but not employed if assigned to treatment, and NE is the
strata for those who would be unemployed if assigned to control, but employed if assigned
to treatment.
FF's rst result states that the observed data (Yi;i;Si) contains information on
the counterfactual Yi(1;Si(0)) only for the subpopulation of individuals where treatment
(i) does not aect the mechanism (Si), such that Si(0) = Si(1) and Yi = Yi(1;Si(0)).
With this result in mind, it follows that from the data is possible to identify objects for
certain strata. Let the \Local" NATE, or LNATE, be dened as the NATE for a given
principal strata in (7):
LNATEk = E[Yi(1;Si(0))jk]   E[Yi(0)jk];fork = NN;EE;EN;NE (8)
In general the LNATEk in (8) is useful for analyzing treatment eects in the presence
of self-selection. In particular, LNATEk in (8) will be used to analyze treatment eects
of JC on participants' wages. The reason for using (8) is that wages are not dened for
individuals when they are not employed, therefore, one has to focus on those individuals
with dened wages independent of treatment assignment. This is the case for individuals
that belong to the k = EE strata. Notice that k = EE corresponds to the strata for
which the mechanism is not aected by treatment assignment. Another strata in which
the mechanism is not aected by treatment would be k = NN, but we will not be able to
compute LNATENN since wages for this individuals are not dened in neither treatment
arm (k = NN is comprised of always unemployed individuals). Furthermore, within
15the EE strata, comparisons between average wages by treatment assignment will have a
causal interpretation, since the strata an individual belongs to is not aected by treatment
assignment. Intuitively, \estimation" of the parameter LNATEEE on wages controls for
selection into employment.16
Note that, the LNATEEE parameter is equivalent to the ATEEE parameter used
by Zhang et al. (2008), and the ATE in Lee (2009). To see this, notice that from
FF's rst result Yi = Yi(1;Si(0)), for k = EE, thus, LMATEEE = E[Yi(1)jEE]  
E[Yi(1;Si(0))jEE] = 0 (the same applies when k = NN). Identication of the LNATEk
parameter for k dierent than EE is not possible given that wages are not well-dened
when individuals are unemployed.
4.1 Basic Assumptions and Identication of Bounds
Without enough assumptions, point identication of LNATEEE in the form of (8)
is not possible since one does not observe the counterfactual E[Yi(1;Si(0))jEE]. Thus,
the focus is on partial identication of LNATEEE. To partially identify LNATEEE, we
start by making the following assumptions:
Assumption A: Randomly Assigned Treatment.
Assumption B: Individual Level Monotonicity of  on S().
Assumptions A and B correspond to assumptions A1 and A2 in FF, respectively.
Assumption A corresponds implies independence of the errors in regressions (1) and (2)
(u1i;u2i) and (i;X). This commonly used assumption is ensured by the random assign-
ment of treatment in the NJCS. The monotonicity assumption (B) is applied to the eect
that the treatment has on the mechanism.17 Specically, monotonicity states that treat-
16Identication of LNATEEE using PS framework is similar to the estimation of Local average treat-
ment eects using instrumental variables by Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin
(1996).
17Assumption B is also commonly invoked in the literature of imperfect compliance but is applied to
the eect of an instrument on treatment status (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; and Angrist, Imbens and
Rubin, 1996).
16ment assignment can only aect the mechanism in one direction, Si(1)  Si(0) for all
i. Zhang et al. (2008) and Lee (2009) employed the monotonicity assumption, stated as
how treatment aects selection into employment. In this particular application, sample
selection, dened by employment status (Si()), corresponds to the \so-called" mecha-
nism variable. Therefore, up to this point, the approaches in Zhang et al. (2008), and
Lee (2009) yield the same results as in FF.
Given the monotonicity assumption (B) of a non-decreasing eect of i on Si, one
may rule out the existence of the principal strata dened as EN, comprised of individuals
whose likelihood of employment was aected negatively given that they were assigned to
the treatment group. In the context of Job Corps, individual level monotonicity is likely
to hold since the program oers job search assistance to their participants. Unfortunately,
Assumption B is not testable and a negative impact of treatment on employment can not
be statistically ruled out. As shown in the last column of Table 3, Assumption B allows the
identication of some members in EE and NN, they are dened by the observed groups
(rst column) with (i;Si) (0, 1) and (1,0), respectively. Furthermore, given assumptions
A and B, the proportions of each principal strata in the population are point identied
(Zhang et al., 2008; and FF, 2010). Let k be the population proportions of each principal
strata k = NN;EE;EN;NE, and let pSj  Pr(Si = sji = t) for (t;s) = 0;1. Then,
EE = p1j0;NN = p0j1;NE = p1j1   p1j0 = p0j0   p0j1 and EN = 0.
From Table 3, we know that individuals in the observed group with (i;Si) = (0;1)
belong to the strata of interest EE (Last row and column). Therefore, from LNATEEE =
E[Yi(1;Si(0))jEE] E[Yi(0)jEE] one can point identify the control E[Yi(0)jEE] by com-
puting E[Yiji = 0;Si = 1]. On the other hand, is not possible to point identify
E[Yi(1;Si(0))jEE], since the average outcome for individuals in the observed group with
(i;Si) = (1;1), contains units from two strata, EE and NE. With the known popula-
tion proportions k, however, note that E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1] can be written as a weighted
average between individuals in EE and NE:







Notice in (9) that the proportion of EE in the group (i;Si) = (1;1) can be point
17identied as EE=(EE+NE)=p1j0=p1j1. Therefore, following the identication results by
Zhang et al. (2008), and FF (2010), which are the same as those reported in Lee (2009),18
E[Yi(1)jEE] can be bounded from above by the expected value of Yi for the (p1j0=p1j1)
fraction of the largest values of Yi for those in the observed group (i;Si)=(1, 1). In
other words, we cannot identify which observations belong to E[Yi(1)jEE], the \infra-
marginal" individuals, and which belong to E[Yi(1)jNE], the \marginal" individuals.
But the \worst-case" scenario is that the largest values (p1j0=p1j1) of Yi belong to the
\infra-marginal" individuals. Thus, computing the expected value of Yi after trimming
the lower tail of the distribution of Yi, in (i;Si)=(1, 1), by 1 (p1j0=p1j1) yields an upper
bound for the \infra-marginal" group (Lee, 2009). Similarly, E[Yi(1)jEE] can be bounded
from below by the expected value of Yi for the (p1j0=p1j1) fraction of the smallest values
of Yi for those in the same observed group.
From FF proposition 1, LNATEEE has the following upper and lower bounds,
UBEE and LBEE, respectively:
UBEE = E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y
11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)]   E[Yiji = 0;Si = 1]
LBEE = E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y
11




(p1j0=p1j1) denote the 1 (p1j0=p1j1) and the (p1j0=p1j1) quantile
of Yi conditional on i = 1 and Si = 1, respectively.
4.1.1 Estimation Using Basic Assumptions
The estimates of bounds in (10) have the following sample analog form:
18The identication procedure in Lee (2009), which uses a generalize sample selection model approach,
is the same in nature to that in Zhang et al. (2008) and Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2010), both under
a PS framework. Specically, from the wage regression in (1) Lee noted that the observed population
mean for the treatment group E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1] corresponds to a weighted average of \infra-marginal"
individuals, whose employment is not aected by treatment assignment, and \marginal" individuals, who
are induced by the treatment assignment to be selected into the sample; hence, resulting in Equation (9).
From this point on, Lee (2009) calculates trimming proportions based on the same intuition provided in
Zhang, et al. (2008) and FF (2010) for bounding E[Yi(1)jEE] in equation (9).
18\ UBEE =
n
i=1Yi  i  Si  1[Yi  d y1 ^ p]
n
i=1i  Si  1[Yi  d y1 ^ p]
 
n
i=1Yi  (1   i)  Si
n
i=1(1   i)  Si
\ LBEE =
n
i=1Yi  i  Si  1[Yi  b y^ p]
n
i=1i  Si  1[Yi  b y^ p]
 
n
i=1Yi  (1   i)  Si
n
i=1(1   i)  Si
;
(11)
where ^ p, the sample analog of (p1j0=p1j1), is used to pin down the quantiles (d y1 ^ p
and b y^ p) of the treatment group outcome distribution (analogs to the quantiles y11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)
and y11
(p1j0=p1j1) in (10), respectively), is calculated as follows:
^ p =
n









Up to this point, using basic assumptions A and B, our results are quantitatively
equivalent to those reported by Lee (2009). Specically, Lee (2009) calculates the trim-
ming proportion by taking the treatment control dierence in the proportion with non-
missing outcomes and dividing by the proportion that is selected in the treatment group.19
Afterwards, Lee uses this proportion to calculate the threshold quantiles to trim the data
and compute bounds for the treatment eect, yielding the same bounds estimates as those
in (11). Lee (2009) shows that bounds in (11) are sharp and asymptotically normal, which
allows the computation of condence intervals.
4.2 Narrowing Bounds: Weak Monotonicity Within and Across
Strata
We now consider two assumptions that can help sharpen the bounds in (10). The
rst assumption is related to, but dierent from, Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper
(2000) \monotone treatment response". Their assumption states that the individual po-
tential outcomes are a monotone function of the treatment, i.e., Yi(1)  Yi(0) for all i.
In contrast to the monotone treatment response, our assumption is weaker since it allows
some individual eects of the treatment on the outcome to be negative. This is accom-
plished by imposing monotonicity on the mean potential outcomes for those individuals in
the EE strata. Notice our assumption is a subset of FF's Assumption B, who uses weak




 ] with  summing
for the entire sample n, is equivalent to the expression for ^ p in (12)
19monotonicity of mean potential outcomes within each of the four stratum. Formally, we
employ:
Assumption C: Weak Monotonicity of Mean Potential Outcomes Within the EE Strata.
E[Y (1;S(0))jEE]  E[Y (0)jEE]
In addition to the basic assumptions A and B, Assumption C implies that LNATEEE 
0.20 Therefore, the lower bound in (10) becomes: maxf0;LBEEg; while the upper bound
remains unchanged. In the context of Job Corps, Assumption C is likely to hold given
that participants are exposed to substantial academic instruction.21 Thus, consistent
with conventional human capital theories in economics, one would expect, on average, a
non-negative eect of treatment (JC participation) on wages.
As pointed out by FF, a potentially unattractive feature of Assumption C is that it
restricts the sign of the eect of interest. We now consider a second assumption that is
available in the partial identication literature. Our assumption is related to, but dier-
ent from Manski and Pepper (2000) \monotone instrumental variable". Their assumption
states that mean responses vary weakly monotonically across subpopulations dened by
specic values of the instrument. In contrast, our assumption conditions mean responses
on two of the basic principal strata dened by a specic value of the mechanism, i.e.,
S(1). A formal statement of our assumption is as follows:
Assumption D: Weak Monotonicity of Mean Potential Outcomes Across the EE and
NE Strata.
E[Y (1)jEE]  E[Y (1)jNE]
Assumption D is a subset of FF's Assumption C. Although their approach is the basis
for our analysis, their application does not deal with censored outcomes, and thus, their
20To see this, take the LNATEEE denition in (8), E[Y (1;S(0))jEE]   E[Y (0)jEE], employing As-
sumption C, E[Y (1;S(0))jEE]  E[Y (0)jEE], will result in LNATEEE  0.
21On average, JC participants can expect to receive about 440 hours of academic instruction (Schochet
et al., 2001).
20assumption also contemplates weak monotonic relations with respect to the NN strata.
Our assumption is also related to the stochastic dominance assumption in Blundell et.
al., (2007), Lechner and Melly (2010), and Zhang et. al., (2008). Their assumption is a
special case of the \monotone instrumental variable" assumption, applied in settings with
missing outcomes, and it relates to the stochastic dominance conditions (Manski, 2003).
Similarly to the above mentioned literature, Assumption D formalizes the notion that
the EE strata is likely to be comprise of more capable individuals than those belonging
to the NE strata, since ability is positively correlated with labor market outcomes (e.g.
wages, employment) one should expect potential outcomes for the EE strata to weakly
dominate those for the NE strata. In our particular application, Assumption D is not
directly testable since we are dealing with censored outcomes22, however, in the estimation
section we provide an indirect way of gauging its plausibility.
Employing assumptions A and B in addition to Assumption D results in tighter
bounds. To illustrate this derivation consider the following: from (8), LNATEEE =
E[Yi(1;Si(0))jEE]   E[Yi(0)jEE], one can point identify the control E[Yi(0)jEE] by
computing E[Yiji = 0;Si = 1] while E[Yi(1;Si(0))jEE] is only partially identied. The
average outcome in the observed group with (i;Si) = (1;1), contains units from two




(EE+NE)E[Yi(1)jNE]. After solving for E[Yi(1)jNE], substitute
it into the inequality of Assumption C6, the result suggest that E[Yi(1)jEE]  E[Yiji =
1;Si = 1], implying that E[Yi(1)jEE] is bounded from below by E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1].
Therefore, the lower bound in (10) becomes: E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1]   E[Yiji = 0;Si = 1].
4.2.1 Estimation Using Basic Assumptions and Assumptions C and D
When Assumption C is added to the basic assumptions (A and B), the upper bound
estimate of (10) remains \ UBEE from (13). The estimate for the lower bound, however,
is taken to be the max between zero and the lower bound estimated in (13). Formally,
in addition to the basic assumptions, under weak monotonicity within the EE strata the
lower bound sample estimate is:
22In a setting were outcome data is not censored, FF provided a formal test that requires the combi-
nation of several of their assumptions that can be use to falsify these assumptions.
21\ LBc
EE = maxf0; \ LBEEg (13)
We now explore the tightening power of Assumption D, in combination with A and
B. As with Assumption C, the upper bound estimate of (10) remains \ UBEE from (13).










i=1Yi  (1   i)  Si
n
i=1(1   i)  Si
(14)
Although Assumption D is not directly testable, we can compare average baseline
characteristics across strata as an indirect way of gauging its plausibility. Intuitively, one
should expect greater or equal average values of characteristics for the EE strata, follow
by the NE, and lastly by the NN (i.e., a weakly monotonic rank across strata). We
perform this indirect test in our empirical application (section 6).
The next section will summarize the results of using PS framework and our identi-
fying assumptions to bound eects at dierent quantiles of the wage distribution.
5 Bounds on Quantiles of Treatment Eects
The principal stratication framework introduced, discussed, and implemented in
the previous section, provides the basis for analyzing dierent quantiles in the distribution
of eects that JC participation have on post treatment wages. Specically, this section
reports bounds for treatment eects on the 5th;10th;:::; and 95th percentile of participants'
wages in week 208.
The parameter of interest in this particular section is the \Quantile Treatment
Eect" (QTE), dened as the dierence in quantiles between the treated and control
groups' outcomes at a given quantile level \" (Abadie, et. al., 2002; and Chernozhukov
and Hansen, 2005). Conventionally, this dierence is dened as long as the marginal
distributions of potential outcomes are identied, in our particular application, however,
marginal distributions of potential outcomes are only partially identied. Nevertheless,
we follow the same conventional rationale and propose the estimation of bounds on the
22QTE based on the partial identication results derived using PS.
Our work on QTE is closely related to two papers. First, Blundell, et. al., (2007)
derived sharp bounds on the distribution of wages and the interquantile range, which is
their measure to study income inequality in the U.K. for years 1978 to 2000. Their work
builds on Manski (1994) and Manski and Pepper (2000). From this starting point, the
\worst-case" bounds on the conditional quantiles (Manski, 1994), they imposed theoreti-
cal motivated restrictions to tighten bounds on quantiles. First they introduced positive
selection into work, which is expressed as the stochastic dominance of employed individ-
uals' wages on wages for the unemployed. Note that this is analogous to Assumption D
in our paper. Second, Blundell, et al., (2007) considered exclusion restrictions that can
be weakened with monotonicity.23 Exclusions restrictions were shown to have tightening
power, however, their use is out of the scope of our paper.
Blundell, et. al., (2007) were interested in population parameters and since wages
are not dened for unemployed individuals, their procedure requires nonparametric esti-
mation of employment probabilities and the observed wage distribution amongst workers
conditional on a set of characteristics X. In contrast, our study focuses on analyzing
QTE for a particular subpopulation with dened wages, the EE strata, and thus we do
not rely on nonparametric estimates of employment probabilities and wage distributions.
Even though, in our particular application we do not identify population parameters,
when studying job training program eects our parameter is considered relevant for pol-
icy purposes. Note that we partially identify the eect of training on a population that
accounts for 57% of the total sample, where 39% are individuals with undened wages
and the remainder 4% are individuals with dened wages dependent on being assigned to
treatment ( = 1).
Second, Lechner and Melly (2010) use partial identication to bound wage eects of
a German job training program. To bound QTE they consider a nonparametric version
of the linear quantile regression (Koenker and Portnoy, 1987) to estimate the conditional
distribution function, in doing so, they rely on the propensity score to reduce the di-
mensionality problem.24 In contrast, due to the experimental nature of our data and
23In a dierent setting, Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2010b) imposes similar restrictions to derive bounds
on local average treatment eects, using invalid instrumental variables.
24Another shortcoming in the application, not the methodology, in Lechner and Melly (2010) is data
23our set of assumptions, identication and use of principal stratication allow us to rely
on asymmetrically trimmed distributions (Lee, 2009), unconditional on covariates,25 to
estimate QTE. Therefore, we fully relax assumptions of unconfoundedness, traditionally
seen as an all or nothing assumptions (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). In what follows
we formally introduce the proposed methodology to bound QTE.
Let  2 (0;1) denote the -quantile of the distribution of individuals' wages that
belong to the EE principal strata F(YijEE). Following the same intuition for identi-
cation of the sample population quantity E[Yiji = 0;Si = 1] and the trimmed means
E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
(p1j0=p1j1)] and E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)], which are
comprised of individuals that belong to EE, we propose the construction of bounds for
the local quantile treatment eect LQTE
EE as follow:






EE = F[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y
11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)]
  F[Yiji = 0;Si = 1]
LB

EE = F[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y
11
(p1j0=p1j1)]
  F[Yiji = 0;Si = 1]
(15)
Where F[] is the -quantile of F[]. Analogous to (10), F[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi 
y11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)] and F[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
(p1j0=p1j1)] correspond to the upper and lower
bounding distributions of infra-marginals, i.e., those individuals that belong to EE in the
observed group (i;Si) = (1;1).26 As such, UB
EE is an upper bound of the dierence in
driven. Basically, they don't have data on wages, and thus, use results of an intuitive decomposition
of earnings to conclude about the eect of training on human capital. Specically they decompose
E[Y (1) Y (0)] = E[Y (1) Y (0)jS(1) = 1]Pr(S(1) = 1)+(E[Y (0)jS(0)  S(1)])Pr(S(0)  S(1)), where
Y represents earnings, the rest is consistent with our notation. The rst term is the eect on human
capital and the second the eect on employment.
25Lee (2009) uses baseline characteristics to tighten bounds. The idea is to split the sample into
mutually exclusive groups based on observed covariates and perform the analysis separately in each
group.
26Recall in the case of bounds derived in (10), E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)] and E[Yiji =
1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
(p1j0=p1j1)] represented the upper and lower bounds for infra-marginal individuals' means.
24quantiles between the treated and control groups' dened outcomes at a given -quantile.
Similarly, LB
EE represents a lower bound for this dierence.
5.1 Estimation Using Basic Assumptions
The estimates of bounds in (15) are obtained as follow:
\ UB
EE = b yu
   b yc

\ LB
EE = b yl




where the -quantiles for both marginal distribution are calculated as:
c ybd
 = minfy :
n




with bd = u;l for the upper and lower bounding distribution, respectively; and Y bd
represents the distributions F[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)] for bd = u and F[Yiji =
1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
(p1j0=p1j1)] for bd = l, in (14). Similarly, the -quantiles for the observed
control group with (i;Si) = (0;1), are calculated as:
b yc
 = minfy :
n
i=1(1   i)  Si  1[Y c  y]
n
i=1(1   i)  Si
 g;
with Y c given by the distribution F[Yiji = 0;Si = 1] of individuals in the observed
control group.
5.2 Identication and Estimation Using Assumptions C and D
Analogous to Section 4.2, we seek to tighten bounds in (15) by employing As-
sumptions C and D. These assumptions impose direct restrictions on the distributions
of infra-marginal individuals allowing for a more accurate identication. Since section
4.2 contains a detail exposition of how these restrictions work in our application (and in
general), the focus here is on the proposition, estimation and results that can be derived
based on our framework and the set of assumptions. In particular, we propose bounds
on the QTE as in (15) and estimate the dierence in quantiles of the distributions of
25infra-marginal individuals and observed control outcomes at a given -quantile, where
the distribution of infra-marginals' outcomes has been further restricted by Assumption
C or D.27 Formally we have:












Estimation in (16) will be slightly modied for the estimate of the lower bound
\ LB
EE




c = maxf0; \ LB
EEg (18)
We now consider the identifying power of assumption D, and formally propose:









d = F[Yiji = 1;Si = 1]   F[Yiji = 0;Si = 1] (19)
As before estimation of the upper bound is given by \ UB
EE, and the estimate for
LB
EE
d is given by:
\ LB
EE
d = c yl









i=1iSi  g, and Y t represents the untrimmed distri-
bution F[Yiji = 1;Si = 1].
27We could also combine the assumptions to obtain better results, but in our particular application
this combination does not produce tighter bounds than those using D alone with the basic assumptions.
In other words lower bounds under Assumption D are always the binding maximum.
266 Estimation of Bounds on the Eect of Job Corps
on Participants' Wages
In this section we empirically assess the eect of Job Corps training on wages using
data from the National Job Corps Study. This substantive empirical analysis starts by
imputing the HM \worst-case" bounds. Results from this general bounding approach are
considered a benchmark from which we proceed by imposing more structure as previously
discussed. After reporting the HM bounds (Section 6.1), we report bounds derived under
the PS framework and the basic assumptions (A and B) in Section 6.2, and assumptions
C and D in Section 6.3. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate the identifying power of bounds in
Proposition 1 and 2, respectively.
6.1 Horowitz and Manski (HM) \worst-case" bounds
Table 2 reports the HM \worst-case" scenario bounds for the treatment eect of
JC on log wages in week 208 after randomization. Similarly to Lee (2009), the variable
wage was transformed to minimize the eect of outliers on the width of these bounds.
Specically, wages were split into 20 percentile groups, according to the 5th, 10th,..., and
95th percentile of wages, and individuals belonging to a particular group were assigned
with the mean wage for that group. In addition, we also report these bounds using original
wages. Original wages enable us to: measure the eect of Lee's (2009) \smoothing" of
wages, and more importantly, take advantage of the original variation in wages to further
analyze bounds of treatment eect on quantiles of their distribution.
Column 3 in Table 2 shows that Lee's transformed log wages have an upper bound
of the support, denoted by Y UB in (5), of 2.77, and the lower bound of the support,
Y LB in (5), was calculated to be 0.90. As expected, the \smoothing" of wages has a
large impact on the support of the outcome. From the last column, the upper and lower
bounds of the support of original log wages are 5.99 and -1.55, respectively. Consequently,
HM bounds' width for original log wages (6.244) is considerably larger than that for the
transformed (1.548). Detailed calculations of all quantities needed to construct bounds
in (5) are shown in the second column of Table 2. Despite large dierences, evidence
27presented in Table 2 has the same qualitative implication about the HM bounds using
both sets of wages, e.g., transformed and untransformed. Based on the calculated upper
and lower HM bounds using transformed log wages (0.802 and -0.746, respectively) and
original log wages (3.135 and -3.109, respectively), one is driven to conclude that these
intervals are not informative in the context of JC, as they are as consistent with positive
as they are with negative values. Nevertheless, HM \worst-case" bounds provide a useful
starting point for the construction of tighter bounds. An alternative framework to identify
more informative bounds is discussed in the following section, and will be used for the
remainder of this analysis.
6.2 Results under Assumptions A and B
Table 4 reports results after constructing bounds estimates in (11) for LNATEEE.
Population quantities needed for the construction of these bounds under the PS framework
using Lee's transformed wages are in column 3. Therefore, these results replicate those by
Lee (2009). For example, Lee's trimming proportion p = 0:068 is equivalent to 1 minus the
proportion of EE in Equation (9), which is estimated as (1 ^ p) from (12), and corresponds
to the quantile of Yi with a ln(wage) = 1:636. Lee's trimmed mean E[Y jy > yp] = 2:090
corresponds to the expected value of Yi for the 1-(p1j0=p1j1) fraction of the largest values
of Yi for those in the observed treatment group, E[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)],
which is estimated as
n
i=1YiiSi1[Yi d y1 ^ p]
n
i=1iSi1[Yi d y1 ^ p] from (11). Finally, under both procedures, the
estimated upper bound \ UBEE = 0:093 is computed as the dierence between 2.090 and
1.997, where the latter quantity corresponds to the observed control E[Yiji = 0;Si = 1]




i=1(1 i)Si . A symmetric procedure yields an estimated lower
bound \ LBEE=-0.019 for the LNATEEE. The width of these bounds is 0.112.
Table 4 also reports estimated bounds for LNATEEE using original wages. Pop-
ulation quantities needed for the construction of these bounds are in the 4rd column.
Unlike the HM \worst-case" bounds from the previous section, the bounding procedure
in (10) does not depend on a bounded support, and thus, the eect of Lee's smooth-
ing of wages is negligible. The estimated upper and lower bounds, \ UBEE = 0:099 and
\ LBEE =  0:022, respectively, are slightly greater in magnitude that the estimated bounds
using transformed wages. Consequently, estimated bounds' width, 0.121, is only slightly
28larger. Despite minor dierences, the implication of the estimated bounds in (12) using
both transformed and original wages is the same. One may note that in comparison to
the HM bounds (Table 2), which are consistent with both large negative and positive
treatment eects, bounds reported in Table 4 are narrower, and hence, more informative
about the size and sing of the eect, i.e., compared to \ UBEE, \ LBEE is negative but closer
to zero, thus, these bounds are more consistent with positive eects.28
In both cases, transformed and original wages, we provide bootstrap standard errors
(in parenthesis) for the estimated bounds.29 Our standard errors are numerically equiv-
alent to those reported in Lee (2009) (0.013 and 0.018 for the upper and lower bound,
respectively), which he derived from the asymptotic normality of his bounds. In partic-
ular, standard errors reported in Table 4 give a sense of the accuracy of the estimated
bounds, more importantly, they can be used to construct condence intervals.
6.3 Results Adding Assumptions C and D
Columns 3 and 6 in Table 5 (subheading C) report results after tightening bounds
in (11), with Assumption C, for transformed and original wages, respectively. Implemen-
tation of weak monotonicity of mean potential outcomes within the EE strata results in
tighter bounds for the LNATEEE when compared to bounds for the ATE in Lee (2009),
the dierence is in the order of 17 percent for both transformed and untransformed wages.
To see this, notice that compared to the negative lower bounds estimated in columns 2 and
5 (subheading A and B), which only employ the basic assumptions, the \ LBc
EE for both
transformed and original wages, are zero due to Assumption C. Therefore, the estimated
bounds' width is reduced from 0.112 to 0.093 and from 0.121 to 0.099 for transformed
and original wages, respectively. Given that these bounds are truncated at zero, boot-
strap standard errors (in parenthesis) employ the formula for truncated (at zero) normal
28These bounds are also useful to assert assumptions required for conventional point identication
(discussed in previous section). Notice, the dierence in means estimator 0.034 (2.031 - 1.997) is consistent
with the estimated bounds on LNATEEE, which suggests the following statistical test: Reject point
identication assumptions if the point identied eect 0.034 lies out of bounds ( \ UBEE; \ LBEE) (Manski,
2003).
29All standard errors for bounds not involving maximum operators are obtained with 5,000 bootstrap
replications.
29distribution (Cai et al., 2008). Unfortunately, these standard errors can not be used to
compute condence intervals, unlike those standard errors reported under assumptions A
and B (subheading A and B), and assumptions A, B and D (subheading D).
Columns 4 and 7 in Table 5 (subheading D) report results after tightening bounds
in (11), with Assumption D, for transformed and original wages, respectively. In this case
implementation of weak monotonicity of mean potential outcomes across the EE and the
NE strata results in tighter bounds for the LNATEEE when compared to bounds for the
ATE in Lee (2009). The dierence is in the order of 47 to 49 percent for transformed
and untransformed wages, respectively. Notice, bounds estimates with Assumption D
are also tighter than those estimated under Assumption C. Dierentials are calculated
by comparing the eect of Assumption D on the estimated bounds' width. For exam-
ple, focusing on original wages, under Assumption D the \ LBEE increases from -0.022,
using basic assumptions A and B, to \ LBc
EE=0.037, resulting in estimated bounds' width
reduction from 0.121 to 0.062.
Importantly, employing Assumption D enable us to estimate bounds that are infor-
mative about the sign of the eect of Job Corps training on participant wages, suggesting
a positive change bounded from 0.037 to 0.099 percent (original wages). In contrast, the
estimated bounds using basic assumptions, as those in Lee (2009), are not informative.
Furthermore, compared to Assumption C, Assumption D does not restrict the sign of the
eect to be positive.
As mentioned in section 4.2.1, we perform indirect test to gauge the plausibility
of Assumption D, using baseline sample information on hourly wages, weekly earnings,
and weekly hours worked, which are hypothesized to be related to better labor market
outcomes (e.g., post-treatment wages). According to Assumption D, one should expect
better characteristics for the EE strata, follow by the NE, and lastly by the NN (i.e.,
a weakly monotonic rank across strata). Ranking mean characteristics among EE and
NN is straightforward since it only requires comparing the means between the observed
groups (i;Si)=(0, 1) and (1, 0), respectively. Baseline hourly wages for the EE and NN
strata are, respectively (standard errors in parenthesis): 3.49 (0.08) and 2.56 (0.05). Since
the dierence is statistically signicant, so far there is no evidence against Assumption
D. Similarly to FF, the mean for the NE strata can be written as a function of the
30population mean, the means of the EE and NN stratum and the population proportions,
formally: E[BWijNE] = fE[BWi]   EEE[BWijEE]   NNE[BWijNN]g=NE, where
BWi represent baseline average hourly wages. After computing E[BWijNE] with the
corresponding sample quantities the resulting mean (standard error), 3.94 (1.49), is not
statistically signicant from the means for the EE and NN. This result further suggests
that there is no statistical evidence against Assumption D. Similar conclusions can be
reached when considering baseline weekly earnings and hours worked.30
Following the analysis in Lee (2009), we also examine bounds at dierent time
horizons (weeks 135, 180 and 208) and provide further evidence about the positive impact
of Job Corps on participants' wages. In addition, we provide more evidence about the
tightening power of Assumptions C and D. Figure 1 contains 6 dierent graphs depicting
the weekly evolution of bounds on the treatment eect of interest. We contrasts results
of estimated bounds on LNATEEE by transformed and original wages, graphs on the
left and on the right, respectively; and by assumption, where basic assumptions A and
B are depicted in the upper pair of graphs, Assumption C in the middle graphs, and
Assumption D in the bottom graphs. Given that in both sets of wages (transformed and
original) the estimated results are similar, our focus for this visual analysis is on original
wages (graphs on the right).
Lower bounds using basic assumptions A and B are negative for weeks 135, 180 and
208, ranging from -0.033 to -0.007, the estimated values in weeks 180 and 135, respectively.
These results are quantitatively similar to the results reported in Lee (2009) (which are
reported in the upper right graph). As noted by Lee (2009), these bounds are more
consistent with positive eects, upper bounds range from 0.084 to 0.099, the respective
values for weeks 135 and 208. Implementation of Assumption C results in tighter bounds,
which are depicted in the middle graphs. Note that Assumption C restricts the lower
bounds, in all weeks analyzed, to be equal to zero. As previously discussed upper bounds
remain unchanged across assumptions. Finally, after implementing Assumption D, bounds
become fully informative about the sign of the eect of Job Corps on wages, for all weeks
30Baseline weekly earnings are ranked as follows: for the EE and NN strata 119.46 (2.63) and 89.19
(1.91), respectively, and 198.97 (77.12) for the NE stratum. Weekly hours worked at the baseline are
ranked as follows: for the EE and NN strata 34.69 (0.77) and 35.25 (0.76), respectively, and 40.78 (5.34)
for the NE stratum.
31considered the lowest lower bound observed is 0.030, which corresponds to the eect on
week 180. This last result indicates that the impact of Job Corps on wages is no less than
3.0 percent in the course of weeks considered.
6.4 Quantile Treatment Eect Results under Proposition 1
Table 6 reports the estimated bounds in (16) for the LQTE
EE using Lee's (2009)
transformed wages. The -quantiles studied correspond to the 20 percentiles in column
1, i.e., =(0.05, 0.10,...,0.90, 0.95). Column 2 contains the respective -percentiles of
the distribution F[Yiji = 0;Si = 1] of wages for employed individuals in the control
group. Columns 3 and 4 report -percentiles of the distributions F[Yiji = 1;Si =
1;Yi  y11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)] and F[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
(p1j0=p1j1)], respectively. Notice that, in
columns 2, 3 and 4, wages, as one may expect, are strictly increasing with .31 The last
3 columns report, respectively, the upper and lower bounds estimates for the LQTE
EE,
and the width of these bounds, computed as the dierence \ UB
EE   \ LB
EE. Results are
documented in the following paragraph.
The highest upper bound of 0.203 is observed at the 0.05 percentile; subsequent
percentiles' upper bounds remain positive with values between 0.049 and 0.111, at the 0.60
and 0.65 percentiles, respectively. The upper bound becomes zero at the 0.80 percentile,
spikes up to 0.127 at the subsequent percentile and returns to zero in percentiles 0.90
and 0.95. At the median the upper bound is 0.098, which is close to the upper bound
for the mean (\ UBEE=0.093) reported in Table 4. Also in percentile 0.05, the lower
bound reaches a maximum of 0.105. The eect on the 0.95 percentile is the only one
consistent with negative eects of Job Corps participation on wages, the lower bound is
-0.365. With a lower bound of 0.041, median bounds are informative about the sign of
the eect of JC participation on wages, which is not the case for the mean reported in
Table 4 (\ LBEE=-0.019). Interestingly, lower bounds at several percentiles were zero; this
result can be attributed to Lee's (2009) smoothing of wages. Recall, these transformed
31Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), who proposed a model for instrumental quantile treatment eects
estimation, assume that the potential outcomes are strictly increasing in -quantiles. We have yet to
test the implications of such assumption in our in our model, i.e., monotonicity in the local quantile
treatment response function.
32wages are the mean value within the percentile range of wages they belong to (e.g. wages
between the 0.05 and 0.10 percentiles are equal to the mean value of original wages
between those percentiles), and thus, values of wages from the \worst-case" scenario
trimmed distribution F[Yiji = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
(p1j0=p1j1)] and wages for the observed
control distribution F[Yiji = 0;Si = 1] are likely to overlap when computing LQTE
EE.
A better assessment of the eect of Lee's smoothing is conducted after contrasting these
results with those using original wages (Table 7).
Table 7 also reports the estimated bounds in (16) for the LQTE
EE, but using original
wages. Notice that Lee's (2009) smoothing of wages has large impacts on the lower bound
estimates of the LQTE
EE, this can be seen by comparing column 6 in Tables 6 and 7.
Specically, lower bounds with zero eect of JC participation are not predominant when
using original wages, around 60 percent reduction of zero eect lower bounds relative
to those reported using transformed wages. Using original wages is advantageous in the
sense that it allow us to exploit the original variation on wages, thus resulting in a more
credible analysis of QTE. In what follows the analysis is performed using original wages.
Figure 2 contains a graph depicting the upper and lower bounds, based on results
reported in Table 7. After taking advantage of the original variation in wages, we note
that for higher quantiles of the distribution (higher than 0.75 percentile) the eect of
JC on wages may be negative, the estimated lower bounds for the LQTE
EE range from
-0.003 to -0.200 for percentiles 0.85 and 0.95. This 20 percent reduction in wages due
to JC participation at the 0.95 percentile is about 9 times more negative than the lower
bound for the mean eect reported in Table 4. In contrast, for quantiles below the median,
bounds for the treatment eect of interest are positive. More importantly, for the lowest
quantiles studied, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 percentiles, the upper bounds for the eect of JC on
wages are larger relative to the rest of the distribution, these values are 0.161, 0.102,
and 0.087, respectively. At the median, bounds (\ UB0:5
EE = 0:081 and \ LB0:5
EE = 0:030) are
tighter and informative, i.e., consistent with positive eects of JC on wages, relative to
bounds for the mean eect reported in Table 4 (\ LBEE =  0:022 and \ UBEE = 0:099).
We would like to highlight the importance of these empirical results as they provide
the basis for policy implication discussion in the last section. In summary, according to
the derived bounds for the LQTE
EE, the eect of JC on participants' wages' distribution
33is heterogeneous, this is evident given that, in general, bounds contain positive and larger
eects at percentiles lower than the median than those higher, which may contain negative
eects as they approach the endpoint of the distribution.
6.5 Quantile Treatment Eect Results under Proposition 2
Estimated bounds for the LQTE
EE are reported in Table 8. Consistent with previ-
ous results (section 4.2.1), the restrictive nature of Assumption C (heading Monotonicity
within strata) aects the the lower bounds (subheading LB) on the last ve quantiles
analyzed, note that these lower bounds under the basic assumptions A and B in column
3 are negative. Results for the remainder quantiles (from 0.05 to 0.70 percentiles) do not
change compared to those calculated assuming A and B (Basic A and B), and thus, we
can draw the same conclusions as before (those for Table 7).
Estimated bounds for the LQTE
EE employing weak monotonicity across strata (D
plus the basic assumptions A and B) are reported under columns 8 and 9 in Table 8.
Consistent with previous results (also in section 4.2.1), compared to bounds estimated
using Assumption A, B and C, bounds estimates employing A, B and D are tighter and
more informative in every percentile analyzed. These estimated results can be seen clearer
in the graphical analysis in Figure 3, where Assumption D yields tighter bounds (UB and
LB-D for upper and lower, respectively), followed by C (UB and LB-C) and lastly by
Basic Assumptions (UB and LB).
Importantly, we nd that the program's impact on lower quantiles of the distribution
is higher, with the highest impact being in the 0.05 percentile, where the positive eect
on wages is bounded between 0.084 and 0.161. At the median, the eect is bounded
between 0.042 and 0.081, which is similar but tighter than the corresponding results for
the mean. Furthermore, the eects at other conditional quantiles of the distribution of
wages do not exceed bounds between 0.022 and 0.067. These results are encouraging
with regard to the eectiveness of Job Corps on participant's wages, and provide new
insights about the policy-relevant question of whether Job Corps has a higher impact on
the more disadvantaged participants, i.e., those individuals in the lower tail of the wage
distribution.
347 Concluding Remarks and Implications
In this paper, we empirically assess the eect of training on wages using data from
the National Job Corps Study, a randomized evaluation of the U.S. Job Corps, the na-
tion's largest and most important job training program targeting disadvantaged youths.
In accomplishing this objective we make two important contributions. The rst one, is a
substantive empirical analysis of the eect of the Job Corps training program on partic-
ipants' wages. Results derived in our empirical application provide evidence to answer a
policy relevant question about the impact of Job Corps on more disadvantage participants,
and hence its eectiveness. With legislation seeking to cut federal expending, positive ev-
idence is particularly important for this federally funded program. Importantly, data to
derive our results come from the rst nationally representative experimental evaluation
of an active labor market program (Schochet et al., 2008), and thus implications can be
generalized, with condence, to Job Corps at a national level.
The second contribution, methodological in nature, is that we extend recent partial
identication results of treatment eects in the presence of an endogenous post-treatment
variable (in this case employment) due to Zhang et al., (2008), Lee (2009), and Flores
and Flores-Lagunes (2010). This strategy allows constructing informative nonparametric
bounds for the causal eect of interest under weaker assumptions than those convention-
ally used for point identication of treatment eects in the presence of sample selection. In
addition to providing bounds on average eects, we propose bounds on quantile treatment
eects of the program on participants' wages. Importantly, these bounds allow analyzing
the heterogeneity of this eect on dierent points of the participants' post-training wage
distribution, a feature that is not capture when analyzing mean impacts (Bitler et al.,
2006).
When only considering mean impacts, our bounds are tighter and more informative
about the sign of the eect of training on wages relative to those in Lee (2009). Our
results indicate that the Job Corps program has a positive average eect on participants'
wages measured 208 weeks after random assignment that is bounded between 3.4 and 9.3
percent. Similarly to Lee (2009), we conclude that the program can be view as a human
capital investment given that these bounds are roughly consistent with point estimates
35reported in the literature of returns to schooling (Card, 1999).
The proposed quantile model allows characterizing the impact heterogeneity of Job
Corps training on dierent points of the participants' wage distribution. Impacts on lower
quantiles of the distribution of wages are higher, with the highest impact being in the 5th
percentile where a positive eect on wages is bounded between 8.4 and 16.1 percent. At
the median, the eect is bounded between 4.2 and 8.1percent, which is similar but tighter
than the corresponding results for the mean. Furthermore, the eects at other conditional
quantiles of the distribution of wages do not exceed bounds between 2.2 and 6.7 percent.
These results are encouraging with regard to the eectiveness of Job Corps on par-
ticipant's wages, and provide new insights about the policy-relevant question of whether
Job Corps has a higher impact on the more disadvantaged participants, i.e., those indi-
viduals in the lower tail of the wage distribution. In other words, it is now evident that
the eect of Job Corps is twofold; rst, it has a positive impact across the studied distri-
bution of wages (20 percentiles), second, the program has an eect of wage compression
within disadvantage groups. To our knowledge, the latter eect has not been previously
identied, and thus it sheds light on the eectiveness of Job Corps at a new, important
level.
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nonmissing Mean S.D. Difference S.E.
1 Female 1.00 0.458 0.498 1.00 0.452 0.498 -0.006 0.010
2 Age 1.00 18.351 2.101 0.98 18.436 2.159 0.085 0.045
3 White 1.00 0.263 0.440 1.00 0.266 0.442 0.002 0.009
4 Black 1.00 0.491 0.500 1.00 0.493 0.500 0.003 0.010
5 Hispanic 1.00 0.172 0.377 1.00 0.169 0.375 -0.003 0.008
6 Other race 1.00 0.074 0.262 1.00 0.072 0.258 -0.002 0.005
7 Never married 0.98 0.916 0.278 0.98 0.917 0.275 0.002 0.006
8 Married 0.98 0.023 0.150 0.98 0.020 0.139 -0.003 0.003
9 Living together 0.98 0.040 0.197 0.98 0.039 0.193 -0.002 0.004
10 Separated 0.98 0.021 0.144 0.98 0.024 0.154 0.003 0.003
11 Has a child 0.99 0.193 0.395 0.98 0.189 0.392 -0.004 0.008
12 # of child 0.99 0.268 0.640 0.98 0.270 0.650 0.002 0.014
13 Education 0.98 10.105 1.540 0.98 10.114 1.562 0.009 0.033
14 Mother's ed. 0.81 11.461 2.589 0.82 11.483 2.562 0.022 0.060
15 Father's ed. 0.61 11.540 2.789 0.62 11.394 2.853 -0.146 0.075
16 Ever arrested 0.98 0.249 0.432 0.98 0.249 0.432 -0.001 0.009
household income:
17 <3,000 0.65 0.251 0.434 0.63 0.253 0.435 0.002 0.011
18 3,000 - 6,000 0.65 0.208 0.406 0.63 0.206 0.405 -0.002 0.011
19 6,000 - 9,000 0.65 0.114 0.317 0.63 0.117 0.321 0.003 0.008
20 9,000 - 18,000 0.65 0.245 0.430 0.63 0.245 0.430 0.000 0.011
21 >18,000 0.65 0.182 0.386 0.63 0.179 0.383 -0.003 0.010
Personal income
22 <3,000 0.92 0.789 0.408 0.92 0.789 0.408 -0.001 0.009
23 3,000 - 6,000 0.92 0.131 0.337 0.92 0.127 0.334 -0.003 0.007
24 6,000 - 9,000 0.92 0.046 0.209 0.92 0.053 0.223 0.007 0.005
25 >9,000 0.92 0.034 0.181 0.92 0.031 0.174 -0.003 0.004
At baseline
26 Have a job 0.98 0.192 0.394 0.98 0.198 0.398 0.006 0.008
27 Months employed 1.00 3.530 4.238 0.60 3.596 4.249 0.066 0.089
28 Had a job 0.98 0.627 0.484 0.98 0.635 0.482 0.007 0.010
29 Earnings 0.93 2810.482 4435.616 0.94 2906.453 6401.328 95.971 118.631
30 Usual hrs/week 1.00 20.908 20.704 0.61 21.816 21.046 0.908 0.437
31 Usual weekly earnings 1.00 102.894 116.465 0.97 110.993 350.613 8.099 5.423
After random assignment
32 Week 52 weekly hrs. 1.00 17.784 23.392 1.00 15.297 22.680 -2.487 0.482
33 Week 104 weekly hrs. 1.00 21.977 26.080 1.00 22.645 26.252 0.668 0.547
34 Week 156 weekly hrs. 1.00 23.881 26.151 1.00 25.879 26.574 1.997 0.551
35 Week 208 weekly hrs. 1.00 25.833 26.250 1.00 27.786 25.745 1.953 0.544
36 Week 52 weekly earnings 1.00 103.801 159.893 1.00 91.552 149.282 -12.249 3.238
37 Week 104 weekly earnings 1.00 150.407 210.241 1.00 157.423 200.266 7.015 4.297
38 Week 156 weekly earnings 1.00 180.875 224.426 1.00 203.714 239.802 22.839 4.855
39 Week 208 weekly earnings 1.00 200.500 230.661 1.00 227.912 250.222 27.412 5.127
N = 3599 5546
Variable
Control Program Difference
Notes:   Missing values for each pretreatment characteristic were imputed with the mean of that variable.  
Computation used design weights.  
* Indicates that the difference is statistically significant at a 5% level. 
All proportions of nonmissing, estimated mean values, and standard deviations (S.D.) for pre and post-
treatment variables were the same as those reported in Lee (2009). 
 Table 2. Bounds on treatment effects for week 208 ln(wage) using bounds of support (Horowitz and 
Manski, 2000). 
 
Quantity in eq. (5)  Transformed wages  Original wages 
Bounds on Support of wages   
    5
th percentile mean wage    2.46  4.77 
95
th percentile mean wage    15.96  14.00 
Y
LB  Y
LB  0.90  -1.55 
Y
UB  Y
UB  2.77  5.99 
Control group   
    Observations    3599  3599 
(i)Employment rate   Pr(Si=1 | τi=0)  0.566  0.566 
(ii)Mean ln(wage)  E[Yi | τi=0, Si=1]  1.997  1.991 
(a)Upper bound  (i)*(ii)+(1-(ii))*Y
UB  2.332  3.729 
(b)Lower bound  (i)*(ii)+(1-(ii))*Y
LB  1.52  0.451 
Treatment group   
    Observations    5546  5546 
(iii)Employment rate  Pr(Si=1 | τi=1)  0.607  0.607 
(iv)Mean ln(wage)  E[Yi | τi=1, Si=1]  2.031  2.028 
(c)Upper bound  (iii)*(iv)+(1-(iii))*Y
UB  2.321  3.587 
(d)Lower bound  (iii)*(iv)+(1-(iii))*Y
LB  1.586  0.620 
ITT Effect   
    Upper bound  UB
HM  0.802  3.135 
Lower bound  LB




HM  1.548  6.244 
Notes:  The population quantities Pr(Si=0 | τi=0) and Pr(Si=0 | τi=1) are calculated as (1- Pr(Si=1 | τi=0)) and  
(1- Pr(Si=1 | τi=1)), respectively. 
Equivalently to using Equations in (5) to calculate UB
HM and
 LB
HM, one may use the upper and lower 
bounds for the control and treatment group, labeled (a), (b), (c), (d), respectively, and compute:  
UB
HM= (c)–(b) and LB
HM= (d)-(a). 
The variable wage was transformed as described in Section 6.1; these results are reported under the column 





Table 3. Observed groups based on treatment and employment indicators (τi, Si) and PS mix within 
groups. 
Groups by observed (τi, Si)  PS  PS (individual monotonicity) 
(0,0)  NN and NE  NN and NE 
(1,1)  EE and NE  EE and NE 
(1,0)  NN and EN  NN 
(0,1)  EE and EN  EE 
Notes:  PS stands for principal strata. 
   
 Table 4. Bounds on treatment effects for ln(wage) in week 208 using principal stratification (PS). 
 
PS framework  Transformed wages  Original wages 
Control group   
    Number of observations    3599  3599 
(ii)Proportion of nonmissing  p1|0 = Pr(Si =1| τi=0)  0.566  0.566 
(iii)Mean ln(wage) for employed  E[Yi | τi=0, Si=1]  1.997  1.991 
Treatment group   
    Number of observations    5546  5546 
(v)Proportion of nonmissing  p1|1 = Pr(Si =1| τi=1)  0.607  0.607 
Mean ln(wage) for employed  E[Yi | τi=1, Si=1]  2.031  2.028 
 
 
    p= [(v)-(ii)]/(v)  1 - p1|0 /  p1|1  0.068  0.068 
p
th quantile                
     1.636  1.639 
(ix)Trimmed mean: E[Y|y>yp]  E[Yi | τi=1, Si=1, Yi ≥               
    ]  2.090  2.090 
 
 
    (1-p)
th quantile              
     2.768  2.565 
(xi)Trimmed mean: E[Y|y<y1-p]  E[Yi | τi=1, Si=1, Yi ≤             
    ]  1.978  1.969 
Effect   
    Upper bound  UBEE = (ix)-(iii)  0.093  0.099 
 
  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Lower bound  LBEE = (xi)-(iii)  -0.019  -0.022 
 
  (0.018)  (0.016) 
Width  UBEE
 - LBEE  0.112  0.121 
Notes:  PS stands for principal stratification methodology, as used in Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2010). 
In parenthesis are standard errors computed as described in footnote 31. 
 
Table 5. Bounds on treatment effects for ln(wage) in week 208 using principal stratification (PS) 





Assumption:  A and B  C  D 
 
A and B  C  D 
Control group          
        Number of observations  3599  3599  3599 
 
3599  3599  3599 
(ii)Proportion of nonmissing  0.566  0.566  0.566 
 
0.566  0.566  0.566 
Mean ln(wage) for employed  1.997  1.997  1.997 
 
1.991  1.991  1.991 
Treatment group 
              Number of observations  5546  5546  5546 
 
5546  5546  5546 
(v)Proportion of nonmissing  0.607  0.607  0.607 
 
0.607  0.607  0.607 
Mean ln(wage) for employed  2.031  2.031  2.031 
 
2.028  2.028  2.028 
                p= [(v)-(ii)]/(v)  0.068  0.068  0.068 
 
0.068  0.068  0.068 
pth quantile  1.636  1.636  1.636 
 
1.639  1.639  1.639 
Trimmed mean: E[Y|y>yp]  2.090  2.090  2.090 
 
2.090  2.090  2.090 
                1-p quantile  2.768  2.768  2.768 
 
2.565  2.565  2.565 
Trimmed mean: E[Y|y<y1-p]  1.978  1.978  1.978 
 
1.969  1.969  1.969 
Effect 
              Upper bound  0.093  0.093  0.093 
 
0.099  0.099  0.099 
 
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
 
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Lower bound  -0.019  0.000  0.034    -0.022  0.000  0.037 
 
(0.018)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
 
(0.016)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Width   0.112  0.093  0.059     0.121  0.099  0.062 
Notes:   Assumption A and B for randomized treatment and individual level monotonicity. Assumptions C and D 
correspond to monotonicity within and across strata, respectively. In parenthesis are standard errors, 





Figure 1. Bounds of Job Corps Effects by Week after Random Assignment.  
Notes:   Y axis is the effect on log wages. 
Assumption A and B for randomized treatment and individual level monotonicity. Assumptions C and D 
correspond to monotonicity within and across strata, respectively. 
Weekly Evolution of Bounds for the Treatment Effect 
of Job Corps on Wages, Assumptions A, B, C and D Table 6. Bounds on quantiles of the distribution of transformed ln(wages) in week 208, using PS 
framework and Assumptions A and B.  
α-percentile  α-control  α-F[Y|y>y1-p]  α-F[Y|y<yp]  Upper bound  Lower bound  Width 
0.05  1.499  1.701  1.604  0.203 (0.062)  0.105 (0.077)  0.097 
0.10  1.660  1.740  1.660  0.080 (0.026)  0.000 (0.014)  0.080 
0.15  1.701  1.789  1.740  0.087 (0.014)  0.039 (0.021)  0.049 
0.20  1.740  1.824  1.789  0.085 (0.029)  0.049 (0.028)  0.036 
0.25  1.789  1.866  1.789  0.077 (0.014)  0.000 (0.015)  0.077 
0.30  1.824  1.900  1.824  0.075 (0.023)  0.000 (0.023)  0.075 
0.35  1.866  1.942  1.866  0.076 (0.007)  0.000 (0.013)  0.076 
0.40  1.900  1.975  1.942  0.075 (0.027)  0.043 (0.026)  0.033 
0.45  1.942  2.016  1.942  0.074 (0.007)  0.000 (0.013)  0.074 
0.50  1.975  2.073  2.016  0.098 (0.026)  0.041 (0.023)  0.057 
0.55  2.016  2.073  2.016  0.057 (0.013)  0.000 (0.023)  0.057 
0.60  2.073  2.122  2.073  0.049 (0.011)  0.000 (0.011)  0.049 
0.65  2.073  2.184  2.122  0.111 (0.038)  0.049 (0.032)  0.062 
0.70  2.122  2.184  2.122  0.062 (0.023)  0.000 (0.026)  0.062 
0.75  2.184  2.277  2.184  0.092 (0.004)  0.000 (0.014)  0.092 
0.80  2.277  2.277  2.277  0.000 (0.015)  0.000 (0.046)  0.000 
0.85  2.277  2.403  2.277  0.127 (0.060)  0.000 (0.061)  0.127 
0.90  2.403  2.403  2.403  0.000 (0.116)  0.000 (0.061)  0.000 
0.95  2.768  2.768  2.403  0.000 (0.000)  -0.365 (0.087)  0.365 
Notes:  α-control corresponds to the α-percentile of F[Yi | τi=0, Si=1]. 
α-F[Y|y>y1-p] and α-F[Y|y<yp] correspond to the α-percentile of the distributions F[Yi | τi=1, Si=1, Yi ≥ 
               
   ] and F[Yi | τi=1, Si=1, Yi ≤             
    ], respectively.  
  The upper bound     
  = α-F[Y|y>y1-p] - α-control. The lower bound     
  = α-F[Y|y<yp] - α-control. 
  The width in the last column is computed as     
  -     
  . 
In parenthesis are bootstrap standard errors, computed as described in footnote 31. 
 
Table 7. Bounds on quantiles of the distribution of original ln(wages) in week 208, using PS 
framework and Assumptions A and B. 
α-percentile  α-control  α-F[Y|y>y1-p]  α-F[Y|y<yp]  Upper bound  Lower bound  Width 
0.05  1.526  1.686  1.594  0.161 (0.055)  0.068 (0.062)  0.092477 
0.10  1.648  1.749  1.658  0.102 (0.024)  0.011 (0.011)  0.090972 
0.15  1.705  1.792  1.706  0.087 (0.010)  0.001 (0.013)  0.085782 
0.20  1.749  1.820  1.792  0.071 (0.022)  0.043 (0.020)  0.028330 
0.25  1.792  1.872  1.792  0.080 (0.014)  0.000 (0.007)  0.080043 
0.30  1.833  1.902  1.833  0.070 (0.022)  0.000 (0.013)  0.069526 
0.35  1.872  1.946  1.872  0.074 (0.007)  0.000 (0.008)  0.074108 
0.40  1.910  1.974  1.940  0.065 (0.022)  0.030 (0.020)  0.034106 
0.45  1.946  2.015  1.946  0.069 (0.006)  0.000 (0.008)  0.068993 
0.50  1.973  2.054  2.002  0.081 (0.022)  0.030 (0.019)  0.051643 
0.55  2.015  2.079  2.019  0.065 (0.007)  0.005 (0.016)  0.059961 
0.60  2.062  2.110  2.079  0.048 (0.019)  0.018 (0.016)  0.030772 
0.65  2.079  2.141  2.092  0.062 (0.013)  0.012 (0.017)  0.049378 
0.70  2.140  2.197  2.140  0.057 (0.010)  0.000 (0.012)  0.057159 
0.75  2.197  2.251  2.175  0.054 (0.012)  -0.023 (0.019)  0.076770 
0.80  2.251  2.303  2.225  0.051 (0.018)  -0.027 (0.029)  0.077962 
0.85  2.303  2.369  2.300  0.067 (0.021)  -0.003 (0.022)  0.069914 
0.90  2.439  2.485  2.327  0.046 (0.030)  -0.111 (0.040)  0.157629 
0.95  2.608  2.669  2.408  0.061 (0.036)  -0.200 (0.051)  0.260884 
Notes:   Same notes as in Table 6 apply to Table 7. The difference is that the outcome, Yi, corresponds to original 
ln(wages) rather than transformed ln(wages). In parenthesis are bootstrap standard errors, computed as 
described in footnote 31.  
 
 
Figure 2. Bounds on quantiles of the distribution of original ln(wages)in week 208, using PS 






















 Table 8. Bounds on quantiles of the distribution of original ln(wages) in week 208, using PS 
framework and assumptions A and B, C, and D. 
   Basic A and B     Monotonicity within strata     Monotonicity across strata 
α-percentile  UB  LB  Width     UB  LB  Width     UB  LB  Width 
0.05  0.161  0.068  0.092    0.161  0.068  0.092    0.161  0.084  0.077 
  (0.055)  (0.062)      (0.055)  (0.044)      (0.055)  (0.054)    0.10  0.102  0.011  0.091    0.102  0.011  0.091    0.102  0.011  0.091 
  (0.024)  (0.011)      (0.024)  (0.007)      (0.024)  (0.012)    0.15  0.087  0.001  0.086    0.087  0.001  0.086    0.087  0.027  0.060 
  (0.010)  (0.013)      (0.010)  (0.008)      (0.010)  (0.013)    0.20  0.071  0.043  0.028    0.071  0.043  0.028    0.071  0.043  0.028 
  (0.022)  (0.020)      (0.022)  (0.016)      (0.022)  (0.015)    0.25  0.08  0.000  0.080    0.08  0.000  0.080    0.08  0.025  0.055 
  (0.014)  (0.007)      (0.014)  (0.044)      (0.014)  (0.012)    0.30  0.07  0.000  0.070    0.07  0.000  0.070    0.07  0.039  0.030 
  (0.022)  (0.013)      (0.022)  (0.007)      (0.022)  (0.013)    0.35  0.074  0.000  0.074    0.074  0.000  0.074    0.074  0.035  0.039 
  (0.007)  (0.008)      (0.007)  (0.005)      (0.007)  (0.013)    0.40  0.065  0.030  0.034    0.065  0.03  0.034    0.065  0.036  0.028 
  (0.022)  (0.020)      (0.022)  (0.016)      (0.022)  (0.014)    0.45  0.069  0.000  0.069    0.069  0.000  0.069    0.069  0.035  0.034 
  (0.006)  (0.008)      (0.006)  (0.005)      (0.006)  (0.011)    0.50  0.081  0.030  0.052    0.081  0.029  0.053    0.081  0.042  0.039 
  (0.022)  (0.019)      (0.022)  (0.016)      (0.022)  (0.014)    0.55  0.065  0.005  0.060    0.065  0.005  0.060    0.065  0.065  0.000 
  (0.007)  (0.016)      (0.007)  (0.010)      (0.007)  (0.010)    0.60  0.048  0.018  0.031    0.048  0.018  0.031    0.048  0.022  0.026 
  (0.019)  (0.016)      (0.019)  (0.012)      (0.019)  (0.017)    0.65  0.062  0.012  0.049    0.062  0.012  0.049    0.062  0.061  0.001 
  (0.013)  (0.017)      (0.013)  (0.011)      (0.013)  (0.009)    0.70  0.057  0.000  0.057    0.057  0.000  0.057    0.057  0.035  0.022 
  (0.010)  (0.012)      (0.010)  (0.004)      (0.010)  (0.014)    0.75  0.054  -0.023  0.077    0.054  0.000  0.054    0.054  0.038  0.016 
  (0.012)  (0.019)      (0.012)  (0.003)      (0.012)  (0.015)    0.80  0.051  -0.027  0.078    0.051  0.000  0.051    0.051  0.051  0.000 
  (0.018)  (0.029)      (0.018)  (0.005)      (0.018)  (0.019)    0.85  0.067  -0.003  0.07    0.067  0.000  0.067    0.067  0.049  0.018 
  (0.021)  (0.022)      (0.021)  (0.001)      (0.021)  (0.018)    0.90  0.046  -0.111  0.158    0.046  0.000  0.046    0.046  0.03  0.016 
  (0.030)  (0.040)      (0.030)  (0.001)      (0.030)  (0.033)    0.95  0.061  -0.200  0.261    0.061  0.000  0.061    0.061  0.031  0.030 
  (0.036)  (0.051)      (0.036)  (0.001)      (0.036)  (0.034)   
Notes:  In parenthesis are standard errors, computed as described in footnote 31.  Standard errors’ computations 






Figure 3. Bounds on quantiles of the distribution of original ln(wages)in week 208, using PS 
framework under assumptions A and B, C, and D. 